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I. INTRODUCTION
A young man lies on the couch in his run-down apartment. Empty
beer bottles from the night before scatter the floor. He was recently fired
from his job for his repeated tardiness and surly attitude.
As the man lies on the couch, a television show chronicling a bank
robbery begins. Fascinated with the program, he decides that he wants
access to large amounts of cash immediately, and he resolves to rob a
federal bank. His criminal past has been limited to a few thefts from
retail stores, for which he was never caught.
Knowing little about bank robbery beyond what he learned from the
television program, the man recruits two of his friends to help plan and
execute the robbery. The three men decide they first need to choose the
bank to rob. They drive to the center of town and observe a federal bank
in a shopping center. The men survey side streets around the shopping
center that could serve as part of their getaway route. They walk up to
the doors of the bank and observe the physique and number of bank
employees, as well as the location of security cameras. Finally, they
resolve that this is the bank that they will rob the following day. In
preparation for the robbery, the three men acquire stockings to hide their
faces from any potential witnesses, gloves to prevent fingerprints, a
duffel bag to store the money, and a hand-gun for each of them.
On the day of the robbery, the men drive toward the bank and park
the car on a side street. As the potential robbers reach for the door
handles of the car, they pause, noticing several police cars a few blocks
away. Unsure of the reason for the police presence, the men remain in
the car, hoping that the police will leave soon. After the police watch the
men waiting in the car for about an hour, an officer comes over to their
car and inquires about their reasons for sitting idly in the parked car.
Upon noticing the guns, the duffel bag, and the stockings in the vehicle,
and the gloves worn by each of the men, the officer asks the men to step
out of the vehicle and arrests them. The men, all visibly nervous, are
taken to the police station. After hours of interrogation, each of the men
eventually admits the plan to rob the bank.
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Whether or not this story ends with the conviction of these men for
attempted bank robbery depends on their geographic location. A split
has arisen among the federal circuits regarding whether actual force and
violence or actual intimidation is necessary for conviction of attempted
bank robbery under the Federal Bank Robbery Act (“the Act”).1 If the
alleged attempted robbery took place in either the Second, Fourth, Sixth,
or Ninth Circuits, the men would most likely be convicted of attempted
bank robbery under § 2113(a) of the Act.2 If the men, however, were
tried in the Fifth or Seventh Circuits, the charge would likely fail.3
Under the first paragraph of § 2113(a),
[w]hoever, by force and violence, or by intimidation, takes, or
attempts to take, from the person or presence of another, or
obtains or attempts to obtain by extortion any property or money
or any other thing of value belonging to, or in the care, custody,
control, management, or possession of, any bank, credit union, or
any savings and loan association

shall be fined or imprisoned.4 The circuit courts disagree as to
whether the word “attempts” applies only to the taking of “any property
or money or any other thing of value,” or if it applies to the clause “by
force and violence, or by intimidation” as well.5 Under the former
interpretation, the government is required to prove that a defendant used
actual force and violence or intimidation during an attempted bank
robbery.6 The latter interpretation requires only that the government
1

18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (2006).
See United States v. Wesley, 417 F.3d 612 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Moore,
921 F.2d 207 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. McFadden, 739 F.2d 149 (4th Cir. 1984);
United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Stallworth, 543
F.2d 1038 (2d Cir. 1976).
3 See United States v. Thornton, 539 F.3d 741 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v.
Bellew, 369 F.3d 450 (5th Cir. 2004). The issue of whether attempted bank robbery
requires that the defendant use actual force and violence or intimidation has continued to
divide courts over the past several years as well. See United States v. Corbin, 709 F.
Supp. 2d 156, 160 (D.R.I. 2010) (holding that actual force and violence, or intimidation is
a necessary element of attempted bank robbery); United States v. Smith, No. 07-743-02,
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77588, at *26 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 2009) (holding that actual use of
force and violence or intimidation is needed for attempted bank robbery under the first
paragraph of § 2113(a) of the Act, thus mirroring the view held by the minority in the
circuit split). But see United States v. Duffey, No. 3:08-CR-0167-B, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 4069, at *5–8 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 20, 2010) (holding that only attempted force and
violence or intimidation is needed when the defendant cannot be properly charged under
the second paragraph of § 2113(a)).
4 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a).
5 See Thornton, 539 F.3d at 746; Wesley, 417 F.3d at 618; Bellew, 369 F.3d at 454;
Moore, 921 F.2d at 209; McFadden, 739 F.2d at 152; Jackson, 560 F.2d at 116–17;
Smith, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77588, at *6–13.
6 See Thornton, 539 F.3d at 748; Bellew, 369 F.3d at 453– 56.
2
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establish that a defendant attempted to use actual force and violence or
intimidation in attempting to commit the bank robbery.7
Ultimately, the split has resulted from circuit courts’ application of
conflicting methods of statutory interpretation.8 Part II of this Comment
first discusses the legislative history and policies behind the Act, and
then addresses the current circuit split on the issue of statutory
interpretation of the first paragraph of § 2113(a). The Second, Fourth,
Sixth, and Ninth Circuits, utilizing an inquiry very similar to the
substantial step test proffered by the American Law Institute’s Model
Penal Code (MPC)9 and focusing on the policy goals of the MPC, held
that actual force and violence or actual intimidation is not required for
attempted bank robbery.10 In contrast, the Fifth and Seventh Circuits,
basing their holdings on textual interpretation and legislative history,
held that actual use of force and violence or intimidation is necessary
under the first paragraph of § 2113(a).11
Part III of this Comment examines the opposing methods of
statutory interpretation that have divided the federal circuits on this issue.
This section first explores the courts’ past use of statutory interpretation
methods that focus on the language and legislative history of a statute.
This section then scrutinizes the test for attempt utilized by the circuit
majority and the MPC’s policy reasons behind punishing attempted
crimes.
Part IV of this Comment offers a prediction as to the Supreme
Court’s approach if the Court were to grant certiorari on this split. By
7

See cases cited supra note 5.
Smith, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77588, at *6–13.
9 MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (“A person is guilty
of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required
for commission of the crime, he: (a) purposely engages in conduct that would constitute
the crime if the attendant circumstances were as he believes them to be; or (b) when
causing a particular result is an element of the crime, does or omits to do anything with
the purpose of causing or with the belief that it will cause such result without further
conduct on his part; or (c) purposely does or omits to do anything that, under the
circumstances as he believes them to be, is an act or omission constituting a substantial
step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the crime.”).
10 Wesley, 417 F.3d at 618–20; Moore, 921 F.2d at 209; McFadden, 739 F.2d at 151–
52; Jackson, 560 F.2d at 118–21; United States v. Stallworth, 543 F.2d 1038, 1040–41
(2d Cir. 1976); see also Smith, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77588, at *6–11; cf. United States
v. Crawford, 837 F.2d 339, 339–40 (8th Cir. 1988) (applying the substantial step test to
an attempted bank robbery, even though the Eighth Circuit has not addressed specifically
whether actual force and violence or intimidation is necessary for attempted bank robbery
under § 2113(a), and finding that Crawford had taken a substantial step when he obtained
ski masks and gloves for the robbery, investigated the area of the bank to identify a
getaway route, and planted a getaway car near the bank).
11 Thornton, 539 F.3d at 746– 51; Bellew, 369 F.3d at 454–56; see also Smith, 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77588, at *11–13.
8

2011]

FEDERAL BANK ROBBERY ACT

449

examining a recent case heard by the Supreme Court involving statutory
interpretation of a federal criminal statute,12 this part reasons that the
Court would likely apply an approach centering on an examination of the
text and legislative history of the statute. Accordingly, the Court would
probably side with the minority in the circuit split and hold that actual
force and violence or intimidation is necessary for a conviction under the
first paragraph of § 2113(a). Finally, Part V argues that amending the
first paragraph of § 2113(a) to clearly require only attempted force and
violence or intimidation for attempted bank robbery is the most
comprehensive solution. In amending the statute, Congress would
promote the goals delineated by the MPC while serving traditional
methods of statutory interpretation.
II. THE HISTORY OF THE ACT AND THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
A. The Federal Bank Robbery Act
In 1934, Congress passed the Federal Bank Robbery Act in
response to an increase in serious interstate crimes.13 The original Act
covered only robbery, robbery accompanied by an aggravated assault,
and homicide committed during a robbery or when escaping afterward.14
In 1937, however, the Attorney General requested an amendment to the
Act due to his concern over “incongruous results” that had emerged
under the law.15 The Attorney General discussed a case where although
law enforcement officials apprehended a man as he was walking out of a
bank with $11,000 of the bank’s funds, the man could not be prosecuted
under the statute for robbery.16 A conviction would not stand because he
had obtained the money while the bank employee was absent, without
using force and violence or intimidation,17 and he was stopped by
authorities before leaving the bank.18 Congress consequently amended
the statute, resulting in its application to a broader range of crimes less

12

Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1886, 1890–94 (2009).
James F. Ponsoldt, Criminal Law: A Due Process Analysis of JudiciallyAuthorized Presumptions in Federal Aggravated Bank Robbery Cases, 74 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 363, 364–65 (1983) ; see also H.R. REP. NO. 1461, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1934); Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 102 (1934).
14 Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322, 325 (1957).
15 Id. at 325–26.
16 Id. at 326.
17 The Attorney General noted that force and violence or intimidation is a necessary
element of robbery. Id.
18 Id.
13
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serious than that of robbery.19 Following the 1937 amendments,
Congress placed the crime of robbery in the same paragraph with the
lesser crimes of larceny and entering a bank with the intent to commit a
felony.20 In 1948, Congress separated the larceny provision into
§ 2113(b).21 The first paragraph of § 2113(a) still contained the robbery
provision, and the second paragraph of § 2113(a) delineated the crime of
unlawful entry.22 In 1986, the legislature amended the text of the statute
to add the phrase “obtains or attempts to obtain by extortion” to the first
paragraph of § 2113(a).23
B. The Circuit Majority
There is currently a split among the federal circuits on the issue of
whether actual force and violence or intimidation is needed for an
attempted bank robbery charge under the Act. This split, which
developed after the Fifth and Seventh Circuits diverged from the
majority, arose after years without any significant statutory amendments
and a uniform interpretation of the statutory language among the circuit
courts that had encountered the matter.24 The Second Circuit, in United
States v. Stallworth,25 was the first to examine whether actual force and
violence or intimidation is needed for attempt.26 The Second Circuit
considered the issue in the context of the second paragraph rather than
the first paragraph of § 2113(a).27 In that case, the court affirmed the
defendants’ convictions for attempted bank robbery.28 After first circling
19 Prince, 352 U.S. at 326; see also United States v. Loniello, 610 F.3d 488, 490 (7th
Cir. 2010).
20 Prince, 352 U.S. at 326.
21 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b) (2006); see also Prince, 352 U.S. at 326 n.5; United States v.
Smith, No. 07-743-02, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77588, at *22 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 2009).
22 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a); see also Prince, 352 U.S. at 326 n.5; Smith, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 77588, at *22.
23 18 U.S.C. § 2113.
24 See Prince, 352 U.S. at 326 n.5.
25 543 F.2d 1038 (2d Cir. 1976).
26 See id. at 1040–41. While the Second Circuit was the first circuit court to examine
the issue at the center of the circuit split, a California district court was the first court to
analyze whether the word “attempts” relates only to the taking, or to the “by force and
violence, or by intimidation” as well. United States v. Baker, 129 F. Supp. 684, 685–86
(S.D. Cal. 1955) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a)). The court found that the “attempt”
relates to the actual taking and not to the intimidation. Baker, 129 F.Supp at 686. The
district court noted that where intimidation is relied upon by the prosecution to establish a
crime, it must be shown by proof of conduct or words. Id. at 686. The court did not,
however, make reference to the plain meaning of the text in its analysis. Id. at 685–86.
27 United States v. Bellew, 369 F.3d 450, 456 (5th Cir. 2004) (stating that the Second
Circuit’s rejection in Stallworth of the reasoning of the court in Baker was with respect to
the second paragraph of § 2113(a)); see also Stallworth, 543 F.2d at 1040.
28 Stallworth, 543 F.2d at 1039.
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the shopping center in which the target bank was located, Sellers, one of
the defendants, started to approach the bank.29 The other defendants,
who were still in the car, stopped in front of the bank.30 As they exited
the vehicle, they were arrested.31 Prior to their arrest and in preparation
for the robbery, the defendants obtained ski masks, surgical gloves,
supplies to “fix” a shotgun, and a revolver.32 They had also examined
the bank to determine its internal physical structure and security.33
The court applied a two-tier inquiry in determining if the conduct of
First, the court
the defendants constituted attempted robbery.34
considered whether the defendants were acting with the kind of
culpability necessary for the commission of the crime.35 Second, the
court examined whether the defendants engaged in conduct that signified
a substantial step toward the commission of the crime and was strongly
indicative of a firm criminal intent.36 In applying the inquiry and
affirming the defendants’ conviction for attempted bank robbery, the
court stated that the defendants’ actions were beyond preparation, and
substantial steps were taken that strongly corroborated their criminal
intent.37
The court found that these substantial steps included
reconnoitering the bank, discussing attack plans, arming themselves, and
wearing ski masks and surgical gloves.38 The court further held that their
movement toward the bank indicated that they would proceed with the
robbery, and their efforts were only thwarted by the intervention of law
enforcement.39 The Second Circuit found this analysis to be the proper
approach to determine whether conduct constituted attempted robbery as
it noted that this two-step inquiry closely coincides with the “sensible”
definition of attempt and the substantial step test found in the MPC.40
Although the defendants argued that they could not be convicted of
attempted bank robbery because they failed to enter the bank or brandish
weapons, the Second Circuit disagreed with this “wooden logic.”41 The
29

Id. at 1039–40.
Id. at 1039.
31 Id. at 1040.
32 Id. at 1039.
33 Id.
34 Stallworth, 543 F.2d at 1040–41.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 1041.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Stallworth, 543 F.2d. at 1040 (citing United States v. Mandujano, 499 F.2d 370–77
(5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1114, (1975)); see also MODEL PENAL CODE §
5.01(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
41 Stallworth, 543 F.2d at 1040.
30

452

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 7:445

court reasoned that the rationale behind punishing attempt crimes is that
wrongdoers who set out on a criminal path should be properly arrested
and charged when intent to commit a crime and a substantial step are
established, rather than after they proceed further into their criminal
activities and place innocent people in danger.42
Shortly after the Stallworth decision, in United States v. Jackson,43
the Second Circuit addressed the issue of whether actual force and
violence or intimidation is needed for an attempted bank robbery directly
within the context of the first paragraph of § 2113(a).44 The Second
Circuit extended the holding of Stallworth to the first paragraph, holding
that actual force, violence, or intimidation is not needed for attempted
robbery.45 Prior to the robbery, the defendants purchased gloves and face
disguises, and entered the bank to evaluate the surveillance equipment
and the employees.46 On the day of the attempted robbery, agents from
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) observed the defendants’ car
circling the area near the targeted bank with a fake cardboard license
plate.47 At one point, Scott, one of the defendants, got out of the car,
loitered outside the bank, and then returned to the car.48 After circling,
pulling into a side street, and suspecting surveillance by the agents, the
defendants tried to speed off.49 FBI agents stopped and arrested the
defendants.50 The agents confiscated shotguns, a revolver, handcuffs,
and masks from a suitcase in the rear of the vehicle.51
Following the holding in Stallworth, the Second Circuit reasoned
that the drafters of the MPC wanted to create a standard “more inclusive
than one requiring the last proximate act before attempt liability would
attach, but less inclusive than one which would make every act done with
intent to commit a crime criminal.”52 In this case, the court applied the
MPC’s substantial step test and affirmed the defendants’ convictions.53
The test looks at whether an action is a substantial step in a course of
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52

1962).

Id.
560 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1977).
Id. at 116.
Id. at 116–17.
Id. at 114.
Id. at 115.
Id.
Jackson, 560 F.2d at 115.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 118–19; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1) (Proposed Official Draft

53 Jackson, 560 F.2d at 120. The two-step inquiry from Mandujano that the court
applied in Stallworth derived largely from the MPC’s substantial step test. Id. at 116–18;
see also Stallworth, 543 F.2d at 1040.
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action aimed at achieving a criminal result, and whether that step is
strongly corroborative of criminal intent.54 The MPC lists conduct that is
indicative of, but may not be sufficient, to establish a substantial step if it
corroborates the actor’s criminal intent.55 This conduct includes, but is
not limited to, lying in wait or following the potential victim,
investigating or unlawfully entering the location of the potential crime,
and possessing objects to be used in the crime.56 In applying the test, the
Second Circuit reasoned that the defendants (1) had agreed upon a
robbery plan and had driven to the bank with loaded weapons; (2) were
very dedicated to the commission of a crime; (3) had passed beyond the
point of mere preparation; and (4) would have carried out the robbery
had they not been deterred by external factors, namely, detection by the
FBI.57 The Second Circuit further noted that defendants’ possession of
robbery paraphernalia and their surveillance of the bank sufficiently
constituted a substantial step, and these actions strongly corroborated the
firmness of their criminal intent.58
In 1984, the Fourth Circuit, following the example of the Jackson
court and applying the substantial step test, weighed in on the issue of the
circuit split in United States v. McFadden.59 The defendants purchased
shotguns and disguises, which they hid in the bushes near the bank.60
After driving around the bank and determining that no police vehicles
were in the vicinity, they walked toward the bank.61 They spotted an FBI
agent with a gun, but FBI agents arrested them before they could reach
their weapons.62
The Fourth Circuit found that the defendants “acted with the kind
of culpability otherwise required for the commission of the crime.”63
Additionally, the court found that the conduct of the defendants, which
included discussing strategy for the robbery, reconnoitering banks,
obtaining weapons and disguises, and traveling to the bank, supported
their firm criminal intent and constituted a substantial step toward the
crime’s commission.64 In rejecting the defendants’ argument that actual
force and violence or intimidation is required for an attempted bank
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64

Jackson, 560 F.2d at 119.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
Id.
Jackson, 560 F.2d at 120.
Id.
739 F.2d 149, 152 (4th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 151.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 152.
Id.
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robbery, the Fourth Circuit stated that this conclusion would mean that
the agents must wait until the defendants entered or attempted to enter
the bank with the shotguns in order for the defendants to be liable under
the first paragraph of § 2113(a).65 The court further stated that by being
forced to wait until the potential robbers reached this stage in the
robbery, the lives of the bank employees, police, and any innocent
bystanders would be endangered before an arrest could be made for
attempted bank robbery.66
Six years later, the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of whether
attempted robbery requires actual force and violence or intimidation in
United States v. Moore,67 and like the circuit courts before it, the court
applied the substantial step test.68 In Moore, FBI agents, working off a
detailed tip from an informant, arrested Moore and another man as they
approached the targeted bank.69 When agents apprehended Moore, he
was walking in the direction of the bank, wearing a ski mask, and
carrying gloves, pillowcases, and a concealed, loaded gun.70
The Ninth Circuit held that conviction for attempted bank robbery
under § 2113(a) requires only that the defendant intended to use force
and violence or intimidation and made a substantial step toward
completing the robbery.71 The court stated that the elements of first
finding culpable intent and then finding conduct constituting a
substantial step toward the commission of the crime were both
satisfied.72 In that case, Moore possessed robbery paraphernalia.73
Additionally, although Moore never discharged the gun, the Ninth
Circuit found that one could reasonably conclude that he carried it to
increase the probability that the robbery would be successful and thus, he
intended to use force and violence or intimidation to complete the bank
robbery.74 The court bolstered its reasoning by echoing the logic of its
sister courts, stating that law enforcement officials are not required to
wait until innocent people are placed in danger before making arrests.75
Thus, the circuit courts in the string of cases from 1976 to 1990 that dealt
with the first paragraph of § 2113(a) all held that actual force and
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75

McFadden, 739 F.2d at 151.
Id.
921 F.2d 207 (9th Cir. 1990).
Id. at 209.
Id. at 208.
Id.
Id. at 209.
Id.
Moore, 921 F.2d at 209.
Id.
Id.
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violence or intimidation is not a necessary element of attempted bank
robbery.
The circuit majority gained more support as the Sixth Circuit
addressed the issue at the center of the circuit split in dicta in United
States v. Wesley.76 Reid, a police informant, drove to the bank with
Wesley.77 Reid and Wesley examined the bank from inside the car
before leaving the vicinity.78 Wesley had previously spoken with Reid
regarding bank security and had requested that Reid act as the getaway
driver following a bank robbery.79 Subsequently, law enforcement
arrested Wesley at his home.80
The Sixth Circuit, in accordance with the holdings expressed by the
Second, Fourth and Ninth Circuits, stated that actual force and violence
or intimidation is not needed for attempted bank robbery under the Act.81
The court explained that to read the statute as requiring actual force and
violence or intimidation would be inconsistent with the Sixth Circuit’s
definition of attempt crimes and would require that before a defendant
could be convicted of attempted robbery, there would need to be proof
that a defendant actually confronted someone in the bank.82 Instead, the
court applied the substantial step test analysis.83 The court concluded
that a reasonable jury could find that Wesley’s visit to Reid’s home to
recruit her as a getaway driver, his discussion of robbery strategy, and
the fact that he had Reid transport him to the bank constituted a
substantial step that supported his unwavering intention to rob the bank.84
The issue at the center of the circuit split has also recently been
addressed by district courts. In United States v. Duffey,85 the court
upheld the defendants’ convictions under the first paragraph of
§ 2113(a), finding that although the defendants had not entered the bank
or used actual force and violence or intimidation, they took substantial
steps towards the completion of the bank robberies.86 While the court
recognized that the pre-existing Fifth Circuit case of United States v.

76 417 F.3d 612, 618 (6th Cir. 2005). At the time of this decision, a circuit split had
already been created by the Fifth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Bellew, 369 F.3d
450 (5th Cir. 2004).
77 Wesley, 417 F.3d at 616.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 615.
80 Id. at 616.
81 Id. at 618.
82 Id.
83 Wesley, 417 F.3d at 620.
84 Id. at 616–20.
85 No. 3:08-CR-0167-B, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4069 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 20, 2010).
86 Id. at *4–8.
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Bellew87 held that actual force and violence or intimidation is needed for
attempted bank robbery,88 the court found that the holding in Bellew was
not controlling since the facts of Duffey are distinguishable from those in
Bellew.89 Furthermore, in dicta, the district court noted that extending
the holding of Bellew to the facts of Duffey would imply that a defendant
needs to either enter the bank or use actual force and violence or
intimidation to be properly convicted of attempted bank robbery under
§ 2113(a).90 The court stated that this would contradict public policy
interests and the goal of prosecuting attempted crimes.91
C. The Circuit Minority
The Fifth Circuit in United States v. Bellew bucked the trend and
held that actual force and violence or intimidation is necessary for a
conviction of attempted bank robbery under the first paragraph of
§ 2113(a).92 Bellew entered a bank, wearing what bank employees
described as an “obvious” wig, and carrying a briefcase that police later
found to contain a firearm, instructions on how to rob the bank, and a
demand note.93 When he entered the bank, he asked to speak to the
manager, but a bank employee told him that the manager was busy.94
Bellew left the bank.95 When he returned, the manager was still
unavailable.96 The bank manager called the police upon viewing
Bellew’s suspicious behavior.97 When Bellew saw the police, he fled to
his vehicle.98 The police confronted Bellew near his car, and after a
standoff lasting nearly three hours, Bellew admitted his intentions to rob
the bank.99
In deciding whether actual force, violence, or intimidation is needed
for attempted bank robbery, the court examined the text of the statute as

87

369 F.3d 450 (5th Cir. 2004).
United States v. Bellew is part of the circuit minority and is discussed later in this
part of the Comment.
89 Duffey, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4069, at *7. Unlike Bellew, the defendants in
Duffey never entered the bank and therefore could not be charged under the second
paragraph of § 2113(a). Id. at *7–8.
90 Id. at *8 n.4.
91 Id.
92 Bellew, 369 F.3d at 453; see also United States v. Dentler, 492 F.3d 306, 309 (5th
Cir. 2007).
93 Bellew, 369 F.3d at 451.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 452.
98 Id.
99 Bellew, 369 F.3d at 452.
88
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well as the legislative history.100 The Fifth Circuit first established a
lateral issue, holding that the requirement of taking or attempted taking
by “force and violence, or by intimidation” is disjunctive, and the use of
force and violence was not alleged to have been involved in this case.101
Therefore, the court found that only intimidation, and not force and
violence, needs to be shown.102 The Fifth Circuit further noted that the
requirement of a taking by intimidation under § 2113(a) is satisfied when
a regular person in the victim’s position reasonably could infer a threat of
bodily harm from the acts of the alleged bank robber.103
More significantly, in examining the statute’s text, the Fifth Circuit
found that a reading that requires an actual act of intimidation as opposed
to attempted intimidation is the most natural reading of the text.104 The
court looked to the way in which it has previously outlined the elements
of a violation under § 2113(a) to bolster the notion that an actual act of
intimidation is needed for conviction.105 The Fifth Circuit next examined
the legislative history of the statute.106 The court stated that previous
courts have made a determination that Congress added the second
paragraph of § 2113(a) in order to punish a person who enters or
attempts to enter a bank intending to commit a crime, but is thwarted for
some reason before the crime’s completion,107 and probably before the
100

Id. at 453–55.
Id. at 453.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 451 (citing United States v. Higdon, 832 F.2d 312, 315 (5th Cir. 1987)); see
also United States v. Ketchum, 550 F.3d 363, 367 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v.
Woodrup, 86 F.3d 359, 364 (4th Cir. 1996)) (stating that the intimidation element is met
if an ordinary person in the position of the bank teller or other victim could reasonably
conclude that there was a threat of bodily harm from the actions of the defendant, even if
the defendant did not aim to intimidate the teller); United States v. Baker, 129 F. Supp.
684, 685 (S.D. Ca. 1955) (noting that intimidation means to put the victim in fear, but
this fear cannot arise merely from the unpredictable or irrational apprehension of a
particular victim). The subjective fear of the teller is irrelevant in finding whether the
intimidation element is met. Ketchum, 550 F.3d at 367 (citing United States v. Wagstaff,
865 F.2d 626, 627-28 (4th Cir. 1989)). Intimidation can be found from nothing more
than the written or verbal demands communicated by a defendant to a teller because these
types of demands convey an implicit threat. Id. (citing United States v. Gilmore, 282
F.3d 398, 402 (6th Cir. 2002)).
104 Bellew, 369 F.3d at 454.
105 Id. The elements had previously been outlined in a way that required “the
Government [to] prove: (1) an individual or individuals (2) used force and violence or
intimidation (3) to take or attempt to take (4) from the person or presence of another (5)
money, property, or anything of value (6) belonging to or in the care, custody, control,
management, or possession (7) of a bank, credit union, or savings and loan association.”
Id. (citing United States v. McCarty, 36 F.3d 1349, 1357 (5th Cir. 1994)).
106 Id. at 455.
107 Id. (citing Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322, 328 (1957)). The language of the
second paragraph of § 2113(a) states that, “[w]hoever enters or attempts to enter any
101
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person has used force and violence, or intimidation. The court reasoned
that the fact that Congress applied the same punishment for conviction
under either paragraph supports this determination.108 Therefore, the
court stated that if the substantial step test was meant to be applied to
attempted bank robberies, and defendants who only attempted to use
force and violence or intimidation could be charged under the first
paragraph, there would be no reason for Congress to have added the
second paragraph.109 Because the court found that Bellew did not use
actual intimidation, it held that the government did not meet the elements
to convict him under the first paragraph of § 2113(a).110 The Fifth
Circuit noted, however, that Bellew probably should have been charged
under the second paragraph of § 2113(a) since he entered the bank and
intended to commit a robbery.111
In 2008, the view of the Fifth Circuit received support from the
Seventh Circuit in United States v. Thornton.112 Thornton and his
accomplice discussed robbing a bank, and Thornton obtained supplies,
including disguises and guns, for the robbery.113 The accomplice drove
Thornton to the bank and remained in the car as Thornton approached the
bank.114 Near the bank’s entrance, a bystander spotted Thornton in the
parking lot.115 The bystander asked Thornton what he was doing, but the
bystander fled and called 911 when he thought he saw Thornton reaching

bank, credit union, or any savings and loan association, or any building used in whole or
in part as a bank, credit union, or as a savings and loan association, with intent to commit
in such bank, credit union, or in such savings and loan association, or building, or part
thereof, so used, any felony affecting such bank or such savings and loan association and
in violation of any statute of the United States, or any larceny . . . [s]hall be fined under
this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.”
108 Id.
109 Id.; see also United States v. Goudy, 792 F.2d 664, 671 (7th Cir. 1986) (reciting
the legislative history of § 2113 and finding that Congress added language to § 2113(a) in
1937 to cover situations in which people wished to steal banks’ assets but did not use any
force in doing so).
110 Bellew, 369 F.3d at 454.
111 Id. at 452–55; see also United States v. Loniello, 610 F.3d 488, 494 (7th Cir. 2010)
(holding that the two paragraphs of § 2113(a) create two separate offenses even if the
different subsections of § 2113 do not allow cumulative sentences, and therefore the
double jeopardy clause does not preclude a defendant from being charged with both
offenses).
112 539 F.3d 741, 745 (7th Cir. 2008). After the decision in Thornton, in United States
v. Acox, the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois followed the precedent set
by the Seventh Circuit, and found that actual force and violence or intimidation is needed
to convict a defendant of attempted bank robbery. No. 07-CR-145, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 84685, at *9–10 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 10, 2008).
113 Thornton, 539 F.3d at 743.
114 Id.
115 Id.
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for a gun.116 Another person witnessed the peculiar encounter and called
the police.117 Thornton and his accomplice left the scene, but the police
arrived at Thornton’s workplace, searched his belongings, and arrested
him.118
The court held that actual force and violence or intimidation is
necessary under the statute since the statute’s “‘attempt’ language relates
only to the taking and not to the intimidation.”119 The court reasoned that
if only attempted force and violence or intimidation was needed, the
statute would have been written to say “whoever attempts by force and
violence or intimidation . . . .”120 The court explicitly pointed out that
similar to Bellew, Thornton could have been prosecuted under the
second paragraph of § 2113(a).121
Since force and violence were not alleged, the court applied an
objective test to determine if Thornton had used actual intimidation that
would cause an ordinary person to reasonably feel that resistance or
defiance would be met with force.122 The court found there was no
actual intimidation as Thornton did not enter the bank or demand money,
had no direct contact with anyone in the bank, and made no implicit or
explicit threats.123 The court reasoned that no one, including the
bystander who questioned Thornton, could reasonably infer that
Thornton had a weapon.124
Recently, the issue of whether actual force and violence or
intimidation is an element of attempted bank robbery was addressed by
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in United States v. Smith125 and the
District of Rhode Island in United States v. Corbin.126 In Smith, a police
officer observed a parked car with darkly tinted windows.127 After
running the plate numbers and finding that the tag did not match the

116

Id. at 743–44.
Id. at 744.
118 Id at 745.
119 Thornton, 539 F.3d at 747.
120 Id.
121 Id.; see also United States v. Loniello, 610 F.3d 488, 490 (7th Cir. 2010).
Thornton was originally charged under the second paragraph of § 2113(a), but the charge
was changed to a charge under the first paragraph in order to add the firearm count.
Thornton, 539 F.3d at 747 n.2.
122 Thornton, 539 F.3d at 748 (citing United States v. Burnley, 533 F.3d 901, 903 (7th
Cir. 2008)).
123 Id. at 750.
124 Id. at 751.
125 No. 07-743-02, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77588, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 2009).
126 No. 3:08-CR-0167-B, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4069, at *5–8 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 20,
2010).
127 Smith, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4069, at *2.
117
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vehicle’s registration, the police officer approached the car.128 The two
occupants were fully reclined in their seats, wearing multiple layers of
clothing, and had a large black bag, black ski masks, four cell phones, a
screwdriver, and two BB guns resembling semiautomatic weapons.129
The court in Smith held that actual force and violence or
intimidation is necessary for conviction under § 2113(a).130 The court
concentrated on the text of the statute and employed a test that it claimed
provided guidance as to congressional intent.131 The test has the court
place itself in the position of assistant counsel to a congressional
committee, whose duties include drafting a bill that will protect banks
and similar financial institutions from illegal takings.132 The court found
that in drafting a statute that could potentially apply in Smith, the
assistant counsel could have written language for the first paragraph of
§ 2113(a) that would more clearly convey that only attempted force and
violence or intimidation would be necessary for conviction of attempted
bank robbery.133 Since this indication was not unambiguously made, the
court held that the version that the legislature ultimately adopted requires
actual force and violence or intimidation for an attempted bank
robbery.134
The Smith court further reasoned that it is not clear from the
legislative history that the statutory amendments were intended to
include under the first paragraph of § 2113(a) robbery attempts that do
not involve the use of actual force and violence or intimidation.135
Finally, the court responded to the argument that requiring actual force
and violence or intimidation will weaken the ability of the police to
restrain violent crimes.136 The court stated that the fear that the statute is
underinclusive should not control the interpretation of the statute in
accordance with its plain language.137 Ultimately, the Smith court found
that since the defendants merely stayed seated in a parked car with masks
and BB guns, no reasonable jury could conclude that the defendants used
actual force and violence or intimidation.138

128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138

Id.
Id. at *2–3.
Id. at *26.
Id. at *15–18.
Id. at *16.
Smith, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77588, at *16–18.
Id. at *18.
Id. at *20–24.
Id. at *24.
Id. at *24–25.
Id. at *26.
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Similarly, in United States v. Corbin, the court held that actual
force and violence or intimidation is necessary for attempted bank
robbery.139 In Corbin, the police received a tip from the defendant’s
mother that he was planning on robbing a bank.140 The police observed
the defendant walking up a ramp towards the bank, but the police
arrested the defendant before he could reach the bank.141 The defendant
told police that while he initially planned to commit a robbery, he
changed his mind on his way to the bank, and he was actually going to a
restaurant across the street from the bank when police arrested him.142
The police discovered a bandana and a robbery note upon searching the
defendant and his belongings, both of which the defendant admitted he
had planned to use in the now- abandoned robbery plan.143
The court in Corbin held that in order for a defendant to be
convicted of attempted bank robbery, the government must show that a
defendant took substantial steps towards the robbery involving actual
force and violence or intimidation.144 The court noted that the First
Circuit had not, up until this point, decided whether actual force and
violence or intimidation is necessary for attempted bank robbery.145 The
court stated that its holding would not endanger the public or hinder law
enforcement, since there were other statutes under which the defendant
could be charged.146
III. METHODS OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AS APPLIED TO THE
CIRCUIT SPLIT
In examining whether actual force and violence or intimidation is
necessary for conviction of attempted bank robbery under the first
paragraph of § 2113(a), a circuit split has developed that centers around

139

United States v. Corbin, 709 F. Supp. 2d 156, 160 (D.R.I. 2010).
Id. at 157.
141 Id. at 158.
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 160. Furthermore, the court denounced the reasoning of the Jackson court,
stating that while the objectives of crime prevention and protection of members of the
public are reputable goals, they do not give courts unlimited freedom to rewrite a statute.
Id.
145 Corbin, 709 F. Supp. 2d at 160. In the only factually similar case that the First
Circuit dealt with, the court found that the defendant took substantial steps towards the
commission of the robbery, but also used actual intimidation. Id. (citing United States v.
Chapdelaine, 989 F.2d 28 (1st Cir. 1993). Since actual intimidation was used, it was not
necessary for the First Circuit to decide whether the statute required actual or merely
attempted intimidation. See id.
146 Id. at 159.
140
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the appropriate methods of statutory interpretation.147 The circuit
majority has applied a two-step inquiry to the facts of the respective
cases, bolstering holdings with the policies surrounding attempt that are
delineated in the MPC.148 In sharp contrast, the minority has utilized a
method which looks at the text of the statute, and sometimes extends the
analysis to include the legislative history.149
In the past, when addressing an issue involving statutory
interpretation, courts have generally employed one or more key methods,
such as textualism or intentionalism, the former method focusing its
interpretation on the text, and the latter taking into account the intent of
the legislative body.150 Specifically in cases involving criminal statutes,
an analysis of the text of the statute is the preliminary inquiry of the
examining court.151 While some courts end the statutory examination at
that point, others extend beyond the words of the statute and delve into
the legislative history.152
A. The Text of the Statute in Statutory Interpretation
The plain language of the statute is the greatest indicator of
legislative intent.153 Courts have repeatedly upheld the notion that when
the language of the statute is unambiguous, there should be no further
inquiry from the judiciary, except in exceptional situations.154 Only the
“most extraordinary showing of contrary intentions” from the legislative
history would validate deviation from the ordinary meaning of the
language of the statute.155 Notably, in Carter v. United States,156 the
147 United States v. Thornton, 539 F.3d 741 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Bellew,
369 F.3d 450, 455–56 (5th Cir. 2004).
148 United States v. Wesley, 417 F.3d 612, 618–20 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v.
Moore, 921 F.2d 207, 209 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. McFadden, 739 F.2d 149,
151–52 (4th Cir. 1984); United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112, 118–21 (2d Cir. 1977);
United States v. Stallworth, 543 F.2d 1038, 1040–41 (2d Cir. 1976); see also United
States v. Smith, No. 07-743-02, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77588, at *6–11 (E.D. Pa. Aug.
31, 2009).
149 Thornton, 539 F.3d at 746– 51; Bellew, 369 F.3d at 454–56; see also Smith, 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77588, at *11–13.
150 Kevin C. McMunigal, A Statutory Approach to Criminal Law, 48 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
1285, 1294 (2004); see also Caleb Nelson, What is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 348
(2005).
151 McMunigal, supra note 150, at 1294. In determining how to interpret a statute,
courts often look to precedent for direction and guidance. See Bellew, 369 F.3d at 454–
56.
152 See McMunigal, supra note 150, at 1294.
153 United States v. Van Winrow, 951 F.2d 1069, 1072 (9th Cir. 1991).
154 Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 75 (1984) (citing Crooks v. Harrelson, 282
U.S. 55, 60 (1930)).
155 Garcia, 469 U.S. at 75.
156 530 U.S. 255 (2000).
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Supreme Court faced the task of interpreting § 2113(b).157 In that case,
the Court stated that statutory interpretation begins by looking at the text
of the statute, and not by psychoanalyzing the mental processes of those
who enacted the statute.158
B. Textual Statutory Analysis Applied to § 2113(a)
The courts in the circuit split that have applied a textual analysis to
the statute have all come to the same, uniform conclusion that actual
force and violence or intimidation is necessary to convict a defendant
under the first paragraph of § 2113(a).159 A natural reading of the text
would indicate that there can be no conviction for attempted bank
robbery with only attempted force and violence or intimidation.160 The
statute can be broken down into the elements that the government must
prove:
1) an individual or individuals 2) used force and
violence or intimidation 3) to take or attempt to take 4)
from the person or presence of another 5) money,
property or anything of value 6) belonging to or in the
care, custody, control, management or possession 7) of a
bank credit union, or savings and loan association.161
From this parsing of the statutory text, it can be concluded that there is
no distinction between the elements needed for robbery and attempted
robbery.162 If all that is necessary for attempted robbery is attempted
force and violence or attempted intimidation, the statute could have been
written in several different ways to ensure that the syntax supports this
interpretation.163 Furthermore, the second offense delineated in the first
paragraph of § 2113(a), which criminalizes the actions of whoever
“obtains or attempts to obtain by extortion,” utilizes different syntax than
the language that criminalizes the actions of “whoever, by force and
violence, or by intimidation, takes, or attempts to take” anything of value

157

Id. at 258–59.
Id. at 271 (citing Bank One Chicago, N.A. v. Midwest Bank and Trust Co., 516
U.S. 264, 279 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
159 United States v. Thornton, 539 F.3d 741, 746– 51 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v.
Bellew, 369 F.3d 450, 454–56 (5th Cir. 2004).
160 Thornton, 539 F.3d at 747; Bellew, 369 F.3d at 454.
161 United States v. McCarty, 36 F.3d 1349, 1357 (5th Cir. 1994); see also United
States v. Burton, 126 F.3d 666, 670 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Baker, 17 F.3d 94,
96 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Van, 814 F.2d 1004, 1005–06 (5th Cir. 1987).
162 Bellew, 369 F.3d at 454.
163 Thornton, 539 F.3d at 747; United States v. Smith, No. 07-743-02, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 77588, at *17–18 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 2009).
158
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belonging to a bank.164 The phrase “by extortion” does not precede, but
rather follows the language that references obtaining or attempted
obtaining, thus indicating that the drafters were at least somewhat aware
of the significance and grammatical implications of the word
placement.165
C. Legislative History as an Additional Interpretive Tool in Statutory
Analysis
By solely scrutinizing the unambiguous text of the statute, it is clear
that actual force and violence or intimidation is needed for conviction
under § 2113(a). But some courts choose to go beyond a textual
examination and consider the legislative history of statutes.166 In
Holloway v. United States,167 the Supreme Court found it appropriate to
look not only at the plain text of the statute but also at the purpose of the
statute within the legislative scheme.168 Similarly, the Court in United
States v. American Trucking Associations169 stated, “[w]hen aid to
construction of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available,
there certainly can be no ‘rule of law’ which forbids its use, however
clear the words may appear on ‘superficial examination.’”170
Additionally, courts have noted that if application of the plain meaning
of the statute would be inconsistent with the legislative intent or purpose
of the statute, the court should look beyond the text of the statute to
gather the congressional intent.171

164

18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (2006); Smith, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77588, at *20.
Smith, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77588, at *20.
166 See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 297 (2001); Holloway v. United States,
526 U.S. 1, 6 (1999); Norfolk Redevelopment & Hous. Auth. v. Chesapeake & Potomac
Tel. Co., 464 U.S. 30, 34 (1983).
167 526 U.S. 1 (1999).
168 Id. at 6 (citing Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 145 (1995)). In Holloway,
the court looked at the federal carjacking statute, and held that the statute only required
proof of the intent to kill or harm a victim if necessary to complete the carjacking, rather
than proof of unconditional intent to cause harm or death to the victim. Id. at 12.
169 310 U.S. 534 (1940).
170 Id. at 543–44 (1940) (citing Helvering v. N.Y. Trust Co., 292 U.S. 455, 465 (1934)
(internal citations omitted)); see also Michelle Schuld, Statutory Misrepresentation:
Small v. United States Darkens the Already Murky Waters of Statutory Interpretation, 40
AKRON L. REV. 751, 769–70 (2007). American Trucking Associations dealt with the
interpretation of the Motor Carrier Act to determine the authority of the Interstate
Commerce Commission to institute motor carrier employee qualification requirements
when those employees’ duties do not influence the safety of operation. Id. at 538.
171 Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892).
165
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D. Legislative History as Applied to the Statutory Interpretation of
§ 2113(a)
In viewing the statute within the context of the scant amount of
legislative history that exists, there is no indication that the text does not
carry out the intent of the legislature.172 The 1937 Amendment, which
added to the statute crimes less serious than robbery at the request of the
Attorney General, is helpful in determining legislative intent, as is the
placement of the crime of unlawful entry in the second paragraph of
§ 2113(a).173 Congress added the acts of entering or attempting to enter a
bank with intent to commit a felony or larceny in the second paragraph
of § 2113(a),174 which are crimes that do not require a person to use force
and violence or intimidation.175 Congress kept robbery and attempted
robbery in the first paragraph of § 2113(a).176 The court in Bellew found
that the addition of the second paragraph of § 2113(a) partially remedies
the problem of not being able to convict under the first paragraph of
§ 2113(a) when there is no force and violence or intimidation.177 The
court in Smith also found it significant that the penalties under either the
first or second paragraphs of § 2113(a) are equal, at twenty years for
each.178 Therefore, even after extending the statutory analysis to include
both the legislative history and a textual examination, the more
substantially supported conclusion is that actual force and violence or
intimidation is necessary for conviction under the first paragraph of
§ 2113(a).
E. MPC Policies of Attempt and the Attempt Inquiry
The circuit majority has based its holdings on two principles. First,
these circuits apply to the facts of each case the substantial step test or a
two-part inquiry largely derived from the “sensible” definition of attempt
found in the MPC.179 Second, they also use the MPC’s policies
underlying attempted crimes to support their holdings.180 As stated
172 Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 105 (1943) (noting that the legislative
information regarding the statute is meager).
173 Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322, 325–26 (1957); see also United States v.
Bellew, 369 F.3d 450, 455 (5th Cir. 2004); United States v. Smith, No. 07-743-02, 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77588, at *22–24 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 2009).
174 Prince, 352 U.S. at 326.
175 Smith, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77588, at *23.
176 Prince, 352 U.S. at 326.
177 Bellew, 369 F.3d at 455; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (2006).
178 Smith, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77588, at *23–24; see also Prince, 352 U.S. at 329.
179 United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112, 120 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v.
Stallworth, 543 F.2d 1038, 1040 (2d Cir. 1976).
180 United States v. Wesley, 417 F.3d 612, 618–20 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v.
Moore, 921 F.2d 207, 209 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. McFadden, 739 F.2d 149,
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supra, in applying the substantial step test to the cases, the circuits in the
majority of the split found that the potential bank robbers took actions to
prepare for carrying out their prospective robberies.181 The policies
adopted by the MPC that support the application of the substantial step
test to and the punishment of attempted crimes are the desire to punish
those with clear criminal intent, to deter future crimes, and to protect
witnesses.182 These policies certainly have relevance in the factual
scenarios of the cases in the circuit split, and provide strong motives for
allowing attempted bank robbers to be charged and convicted after they
have used only attempted force and violence or intimidation. One of the
fundamental arguments in support of the MPC’s definition of attempt
centers on the concept that criminal law aims to punish those who exhibit
their dangerous intent or moral depravity through their actions.183
Consequently, disciplining those who intend to perform a criminal act
and fail is fully justified, regardless of the reason for the failure.184
Additionally, the aim of deterring future crimes would be accomplished
by applying the substantial step test to the facts of these cases.185 Not
only does punishment at least temporarily prevent the defendant from
trying to complete the crime again, but it also promotes general
deterrence.186 In the cases here, the defendants that were not convicted
of attempted robbery might be inspired to try to complete the robbery
successfully at another time. This notion is further evidenced by the fact
that prior to their arrests, some of the defendants had originally planned a
robbery for a certain day, but ultimately changed the date of the planned
robbery because they felt that circumstances might have been more
favorable on another date.187 Therefore, they were willing to make
several attempts to complete a robbery.
Finally, the circuit majority considered the safety of bystanders in
its reasoning. The substantial step test precludes attempt liability for

151–52 (4th Cir. 1984); Jackson, 560 F.2d at 118–21; Stallworth, 543 F.2d at 1040–41;
see also Smith, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77588, at *6.
181 Wesley, 417 F.3d at 615–19; Moore, 921 F.2d at 209; McFadden, 739 F.2d at 151–
52; Jackson, 560 F.2d at 114–20; Stallworth, 543 F.2d at 1039–41; see also Smith, 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77588, at *5–11.
182 MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 (Tent. Draft No. 10 1960).
183 United States v. Smauley, 39 M.J. 853, 856–60 (1994); John Hasnas, Once More
unto the Breach: The Inherent Liberalism of the Criminal Law and Liability for
Attempting the Impossible, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 45 (2002).
184 Hasnas, supra note 183, at 45–46.
185 Id. at 46.
186 Id.
187 Wesley, 417 F.3d at 616; Moore, 921 F.2d at 209; McFadden, 739 F.2d at 151;
Jackson, 560 F.2d at 114.
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remote acts in preparation of a crime.188 Yet it allows attempt liability
following a substantial step, without requiring the police to wait until the
commission of the “last proximate act” before intervening.189
Consequently, the substantial step test diminishes the danger to innocent
bystanders.190 In the cases involved in the circuit split, most of the
defendants were carrying guns.191 It is conceivable that those guns might
have been used to harm innocent onlookers if the defendants had not
been thwarted by law enforcement. Therefore, while an analysis of
statutory language and history leads to the conclusion that actual force
and violence or intimidation is needed for attempted bank robbery under
the first paragraph of § 2113(a), reasoning centered around the policy
goals and the substantial step test of the MPC supplies valid grounds to
support the conclusion that one can commit attempted bank robbery
through the use of attempted rather than actual force and violence or
intimidation.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT’S LIKELY DECISION ON THE SPLIT
If the Supreme Court were to grant certiorari to end this circuit
split, the Court would likely come to the conclusion that actual force and
violence or intimidation is needed for a defendant to be convicted under
the first paragraph of § 2113(a), based on the use of traditional statutory
construction principles. In 2009, the Supreme Court, facing an issue of
statutory interpretation of a federal criminal statute in Flores-Figueroa v.
United States,192 examined primarily the text of the statute and only
briefly considered the statute’s legislative history in its reasoning.193 At
issue in that case was the liability of a defendant under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1028A(a)(1), a federal statute that criminalizes the actions of an
offender who “knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful
authority, a means of identification of another person[,]” where the
defendant provided his employer with social security and alien
registration cards bearing his name but the numbers of other
individuals.194
Specifically, the Court
addressed whether the
government is required to show that the defendant knew that the means
188

MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 cmt. 47 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960).
Id.
190 Wesley, 417 F.3d at 618–19; McFadden, 739 F.2d at 151; United States v.
Stallworth, 543 F.2d 1038, 1040 (2d Cir. 1976).
191 Moore, 921 F.2d at 209; McFadden, 739 F.2d at 151; Jackson, 560 F.2d at 115;
Stallworth, 543 F.2d at 1039.
192 129 S. Ct. 1886, 1890–94 (2009).
193 Flores-Figueroa, 129 S. Ct. at 1890–94; see also United States v. Betancourt, 586
F.3d 303, 309 (5th Cir. 2009).
194 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) (2006); Flores-Figueroa, 129 S. Ct. at 1888.
189
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of identification that he or she transferred, possessed or used unlawfully,
belonged to another person or, in other words, whether the element of
“knowingly” applied to all of the succeeding elements.195
The Court began its analysis by using “ordinary English grammar,”
to determine what the statute entails.196 The Court, in a unanimous
opinion, held that “knowingly” applies to all of the subsequent
elements.197 The Court rejected the government’s argument that
requiring the prosecution to show the defendant had actual knowledge
that the identification belonged to another person would stifle law
enforcement efforts to control the use of false documents.198 In briefly
reviewing the legislative history, the Court noted that neither the
concerns about practical enforceability nor indications of contrary
congressional purpose adequately outweigh the unambiguousness of the
text.199
This statutory interpretation by the Supreme Court indicates that an
examination of the statute’s text and possibly the legislative history
would most likely govern the interpretation of federal criminal statutes.
Additionally, governmental concerns regarding the difficulty of
enforcing the statute would probably not persuade the Court to stray
from a natural reading of the unambiguous text. Thus, if the Supreme
Court addressed the issue at the center of the circuit split, the Court
would likely find that actual force and violence or intimidation is
necessary for attempted bank robbery under the first paragraph of
§ 2113(a).
V. FUTURE REPERCUSSIONS OF AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE
CIRCUIT SPLIT
A. The Need for Consistency of Statutory Interpretation Methods
It is imperative that courts continue to apply similar and longestablished methods of statutory interpretation in order to maintain
consistency and predictability within the court system and to avoid
undermining past interpretations of statutes. As discussed in Part II,
courts have primarily utilized a few core methods to interpret laws.200
Although more than one customary manner of interpreting a statute
exists, it can reasonably be assumed that the small group of typical
195
196
197
198
199
200

Flores-Figueroa, 129 S. Ct. at 1888.
Id. at 1890–91.
Id. at 1894.
Id. at 1893.
Id. at 1893–94.
McMunigal, supra note 150, at 1294; Nelson, supra note 150, at 347–48.
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methods has contributed to a sense of consistency in the way courts read
and decipher statutes. This is especially true since the statutory analysis
almost always takes into account the text of the particular statute.201
In this circuit split, the Second, Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits
failed to incorporate any sort of textual analysis into their decisions.202
Instead, these courts focused on the MPC’s substantial step test and
reinforced their holdings with the policies underlying attempt liability as
delineated in the MPC.203 This departure from the use of conventional
statutory interpretation methods affects not only the interpretation of this
statute but the interpretation of all statutes; it calls into question the
future predictability of statutory interpretation and promotes uncertainty
within the lawmaking process, as congressional efforts that have
produced consistent results in the past may no longer be interpreted in a
uniform manner. Courts must adhere to consistent methods of statutory
interpretation because allowing courts to extend beyond the techniques
typically used and to pick and choose the sources and methods that will
be utilized to interpret laws would lead to ambiguity among statutes.204
B. Escaping Liability under § 2113(a)
Although the established and traditional methods of statutory
interpretation should not be abandoned, applying these methods to the
issue at the center of the circuit split has at times led to dire
consequences. Such interpretation has placed innocent people in danger,
while committed and dangerous bank robbers can avoid liability under
the Act, and make repeated criminal attempts. The facts of the cases in
the circuit minority all present scenarios where it appears that a bank
robbery would have occurred but-for the intervention of law enforcement
officials.205 While the courts in each of those cases determined that the
defendants could not be convicted of attempted bank robbery under the
201

McMunigal, supra note 150, at 1294.
United States v. Wesley, 417 F.3d 612, 617–20 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v.
Moore, 921 F.2d 207, 209 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. McFadden, 739 F.2d 149,
151–52 (4th Cir. 1984); United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112, 116–21 (2d Cir. 1977);
United States v. Stallworth, 543 F.2d 1038, 1040–41 (2d Cir. 1976); ) see also United
States v. Thornton, 539 F.3d 741, 747 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Bellew, 369 F.3d
450, 456 (5th Cir. 2004); United States v. Smith, No. 07-743-02, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
77588, at *7–11 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 2009).
203 Wesley, 417 F.3d at 617–20; Moore, 921 F.2d at 209; McFadden, 739 F.2d at 151–
52; Jackson, 560 F.2d at 116–21; Stallworth, 543 F.2d at 1040–41; see also Thornton,
539 F.3d at 747; Bellew, 369 F.3d at 456; Smith, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77588, at *7–11.
204 Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV.
L. REV. 2085, 2088 (2002).
205 Thornton, 539 F.3d at 744; Bellew, 369 F.3d at 452; Smith, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
77588, at *2–3.
202
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first paragraph of § 2113(a) because the defendants did not use actual
intimidation,206 the defendants still presented a danger to innocent
bystanders. Even though Bellew entered the bank and did not harm or
threaten anyone, he armed himself with a gun with which he could have
easily harmed a bank employee or customer.207 Similarly, Thornton
carried a machine gun before he was spotted by witnesses and eventually
arrested.208 Even though Smith did not have an automatic weapon, he
possessed a BB gun that resembled a semiautomatic firearm.209 These
defendants did not use force or intimidation against others, but it can
reasonably be concluded that they had clear and unwavering intent to
complete the robberies, and had the ability to harm others. Additionally,
if the courts in the majority had applied the statutory analysis that the
courts in Bellew, Thornton, and Smith applied, none of the defendants in
those cases would have faced conviction under the first paragraph of
§ 2113(a). All of the defendants in the cases decided by the circuit
majority failed to enter the bank during the attempted robbery and, like
the defendants in the cases in the circuit minority, did not use actual
intimidation.210 They did, however, have access to weapons with which
innocent people might have been hurt or killed.211
206 Thornton, 539 F.3d at 750; Bellew, 369 F.3d at 453; Smith, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
77588, at *26.
207 Bellew, 369 F.3d at 451.
208 Thornton, 539 F.3d at 744.
209 Smith, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77588, at *3. A BB gun has been classified as a
dangerous weapon for purposes of sentencing. See United States v. Dunigan, 555 F.3d
501, 506 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding that under the Commentary to the United States
Sentencing Guidelines, the BB gun qualifies as a dangerous weapon); United States v.
Woods, 556 F.3d 616, 623 (7th Cir. 2009) (stating that whether or not the BB gun was
inoperable, the guns qualify as dangerous weapons under the Commentary to the United
States Sentencing Guidelines, and further noting that a gun is a dangerous weapon if it
bears a strong resemblance to a dangerous weapon or is used in a manner that conveys
that it is dangerous); Developments in State Constitutional Law: 2001: IV. Due Process,
33 RUTGERS L. J. 1299, 1322 (2002) ((citing State v. Johnson, 766 A.2d 1126, 1129 (N.J.
2001) (finding that the defendant had committed a violent crime and sentencing the
defendant was therefore appropriate because the defendant had used a BB gun)).
210 United States v. Wesley, 417 F.3d 612, 616 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v.
Moore, 921 F.2d 207, 208 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. McFadden, 739 F.2d 149, 151
(4th Cir. 1984); United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112, 115 (2d Cir. 1977); United States
v. Stallworth, 543 F.2d 1038, 1039 (2d Cir. 1976).
211 Moore, 921 F.2d at 208; McFadden, 739 F.2d at 151; Jackson, 560 F.2d at 115;
Stallworth, 543 F.2d at 1039. While no weapons were found on Wesley when he was
arrested, he was also arrested at his home rather than during the course of an attempted
robbery, in the vicinity of the bank. Wesley, 417 F.3d at 616. Additionally, Wesley had
told a police informant a day earlier that he planned to commit the robbery with guns and
disguises. Id. at 615. Therefore, it can reasonably be assumed that had Wesley and his
accomplices attempted the bank robbery, they would have had weapons in their
possession at the time.
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While the defendant bank robbers might have been liable under the
second paragraph of § 2113(a), in some circumstances, they might have
escaped conviction completely under the Act. In most of the cases in
which federal circuits have dealt with the issue of whether actual force
and violence or intimidation is needed for attempted robbery, the
defendants did enter or attempt to enter the bank, and thus could face
liability under the second paragraph.212 Additionally, since the second
paragraph addresses not only situations where the defendant enters the
bank, but also where there is attempted entry,213 police intervention
would be warranted at an earlier point. The Sixth Circuit in Wesley,
however, stated that defendants who do not enter or attempt to enter the
bank would escape conviction under the second paragraph.214 The FBI
apprehended the defendants in Jackson while they sat in a car.215 The
police arrested Smith while he was sitting in a car as well, and the district
court found that he had not used actual intimidation, thus granting Smith
his desired acquittal.216 Police arrested Wesley at his home, and he made
no attempt to enter the bank.217
Finally, the hypothetical young man and his friends from this
Comment’s introduction who decided to rob a bank but were arrested
while in their car, did not attempt to enter the bank. Accordingly, neither
this young man, nor the defendants in Smith, Jackson, and Wesley could
have been convicted under either paragraph of § 2113(a) if the view of
the minority is followed. More significantly, if these defendants escaped
charges completely, they would be able to revise their plans for future
robbery efforts. Thus, while courts should continue to utilize the
customary methods of statutory interpretation, the policies of the MPC
have relevant application in the context of potential bank robbers who
might otherwise be able to escape liability under the Act, and
consequently would not be deterred from committing dangerous crimes
in the future.
C. Statutory Amendment as a Potential Solution
While the policies of the MPC are certainly relevant to the factual
situations presented by the robbery of federal banks, it is the legislature,
212 The Fifth and Seventh Circuits in Bellew and Thornton, respectively, explicitly
pointed out that the defendants in those cases could have properly been charged under the
second paragraph of § 2113(a). Thornton, 539 F.3d at 747; Bellew, 369 F.3d at 455.
213 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (2006).
214 Wesley, 417 F.3d at 618 n.1.
215 Jackson, 560 F.2d at 115.
216 United States v. Smith, No. 07-743-02, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77588, at *2, 27
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 2009).
217 Wesley, 417 F.3d at 616.
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rather than the judiciary, that should take these policies into account.
The safety of innocent bystanders and the desire to halt and punish those
with clear intent to commit the dangerous crime of robbery are
significant social priorities. Yet, in order to maintain consistency in
statutory interpretation, the courts should not allow policy issues to
completely invert a conclusion that a court would have reached using
traditional methods of statutory interpretation. In a recent comment
analyzing this circuit split, the author suggests that the solution to the
dilemma would be for the Supreme Court to grant certiorari, and hold
that the circuit minority is correct in holding that actual force and
violence, or intimidation is needed for attempted bank robbery under the
Act.218 This route, however, would merely achieve the single goal of
supporting and reinforcing the use of textual and legislative history
analysis as a method of statutory interpretation. By upholding the circuit
minority’s view, the Supreme Court would not be addressing the
dilemma that would occur in situations where a potential bank robber
would escape liability completely under the Act because he did not use
actual force and violence or intimidation and did not enter or attempt to
enter the bank.
Therefore, the most complete solution would be for the legislature
to amend the first paragraph of § 2113(a), so that it can be
unambiguously interpreted by courts as requiring only attempted force
and violence or intimidation for the crime of attempted bank robbery.
This amendment would most likely allow not only for the convictions of
the defendants in Jackson, Wesley, and Smith, but also the hypothetical
young man, since these defendants had access to either actual guns or
weapons closely resembling firearms, both of which most people would
probably find intimidating.219 The Ninth Circuit in Moore found that a
jury could reasonably conclude that Moore’s carrying of a gun showed
that he intended to use force and violence or intimidation.220 If other
courts were to make the same finding, it could be determined that a
defendant had attempted to use force and violence or intimidation, and
218 Michael Rizzo, Comment, The Need to Apply the “Plain Meaning” Rule to the
First Paragraph of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) is “Plain”: A Bank Robber Must Have Used
Actual Force and Violence Or Intimidation, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 227, 249–53 (2009).
This Comment does not take into account the recent district court cases that have
weighed in on whether actual force and violence or intimidation is needed for attempted
bank robbery. Id.
219 Wesley, 417 F.3d at 615; Jackson, 560 F.2d at 114.
220 United States v. Moore, 921 F.2d 207, 209 (9th Cir. 1990). The Ninth Circuit
found Moore to have “used” the gun during the attempted robbery because even though
he never brandished or discharged it, he carried the concealed gun in order to increase the
likelihood that he would complete the robbery successfully. Id.
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therefore the elements of attempted bank robbery would be satisfied.
Thus, an amendment of the statute by the legislature would meet the dual
goals of 1) allowing the courts to utilize similar and consistent methods
of statutory interpretation, and 2) permitting police to intervene at an
earlier stage in an alleged bank robbery in order to protect innocent
bystanders and arrest potential bank robbers.
It may be argued that amendment of the statute would have
minimal effect on preventing bank robberies as the potential bank
robbers can be charged under either the second paragraph of § 2113(a) or
under another statute. The importance, however, of amending the statute
in order to promote the goals of the MPC in the situations where a
potential bank robber would slip through the cracks of being charged
with a serious crime, or with any crime at all for that matter, is
incontestable. It is true that although the prosecution could not have
convicted the defendants in the circuit majority under the first paragraph
of § 2113(a) if those courts required actual force and violence or
intimidation, defendants can often be convicted under the second
paragraph, which carries the same punishment as the first paragraph.221
Additionally, since prosecutors often charge defendants under multiple
statutes, it is likely that while the defendant may be able to avoid liability
under § 2113(a), the defendant will face a charge and potential
conviction for another action related to the robbery, under either federal
or state law.222
Yet charging a potential bank robber under an alternate statute may
often result in a punishment less severe than for a conviction under
§ 2113(a). By letting the potential bank robber off with a lesser
sentence, or possibly no punishment at all, the robber is permitted to
revise his plan and attempt the robbery again. An increase in robberies
and attempted robberies could have serious effects due to the danger that
robbery presents. Courts have viewed robbery as an extremely
dangerous crime, and the MPC has listed robbery among the predicate

221 See 18 U.S.C § 2113(a) (2006); see also United States v. Loniello, 610 F.3d 488,
491 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting that it is possible to violate the first paragraph of § 2113(a)
without entering the vicinity of the bank, such as where a potential bank robber attempts
to kidnap a bank employee for ransom).
222 See United States v. Corbin, 709 F. Supp. 2d 156, 160 (D.R.I. 2010); Ob’Saint v.
Warden, Toledo Corr. Inst., 675 F. Supp. 2d 827 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 21, 2009). Ob’Saint
involved a bank robbery where the defendant did not use actual force and violence or
intimidation and therefore was not charged under the first paragraph of § 2113(a), but had
his sentence enhanced under the Ohio firearm specification statute, which is satisfied if
the offender displays, brandishes, indicates that he possessed a weapon, or uses the
weapon to facilitate the offense. 675 F. Supp. at 829.
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crimes for felony murder.223 Notably, in a recent case in which a
defendant committed armed robbery in violation of § 2113(a), the
Eleventh Circuit upheld the district court’s refusal to lessen a sentence
despite the fact that the defendant had no criminal record and was an
active member of his community and church.224 The court emphasized
that someone could have been killed during the robbery and the
defendant’s absence of past convictions does not outweigh the severity of
the crime.225
Therefore, amendment of the statute would, at least in some
scenarios, allow for potential bank robbers to be charged under the first
paragraph of § 2113(a) instead of being charged under a statute carrying
a lesser punishment or not being charged at all. The amendment of the
statute would thereby deter future crimes through the conviction of those
with clear criminal intent and protect innocent bystanders by allowing
the police to intervene at an earlier stage in a crime.
VI. CONCLUSION
A circuit split currently exists regarding whether actual force and
violence or intimidation is needed for conviction of attempted bank
robbery under the first paragraph of § 2113(a). The minority of the
circuits is correct in applying the statutory interpretation methods of
examining the text and legislative history of the statute, and in holding
that actual force and violence or intimidation is needed. The policies of
the MPC that support application of the substantial step test to attempted
crimes, however, have much credibility and relevance in the factual
situations that accompany bank robberies. These policies, if applied to
statutory interpretation in the way that the majority in the circuit split has
done, allow for earlier police intervention and the arrest of a committed
potential bank robber before he or she is able to harm innocent victims.
Yet the traditional methods of statutory interpretation used by the
minority of the circuits should certainly not be abandoned, as this would
lead to great inconsistency and uncertainty regarding past and future
statutory interpretation and congressional intent. Thus, the solution to
furthering the policies of the MPC while continuing to use established
methods of statutory interpretation lies in the discretion of the
223 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(1)(b) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1962);
see also State v. Tribble, 790 N.W. 2d 121, 124 (Iowa 2010); Stephen J. Morse, Reasons,
Results and Criminal Responsibility, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 403 (2004) (stating that
armed robbery is one of the felonies that is most intrinsically dangerous to life).
224 United States v. Creason, No: 09-15638, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 13108, at *3
(11th Cir. June 25, 2010).
225 Id. at *4.

2011]

FEDERAL BANK ROBBERY ACT

475

Legislature. Congress has the ability and the responsibility to amend the
wording of the statute so that it is clear, under an analysis of the text, that
only attempted force and violence or intimidation is necessary for a
defendant to be convicted of attempted bank robbery under the first
paragraph of § 2113(a).

